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Making Cost-Benefit a Political Tool 
Roger Meiners* 
Rafal Czajkowski∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Cost-benefit analysis seems like a stodgy topic for those other 
than practitioners imbued in the technical aspects of such 
calculations. But in recent years, it has become an important tool to 
justify certain regulatory goals. Regulations are often suspected of 
dragging down economic activity. However, if it can be shown that 
careful analysis of a new policy shows greater wealth after its 
adoption, the regulation is easier to justify and more difficult for its 
opponents to dismiss. As reviewed in this Article, cost-benefit 
analysis is now actively employed to justify an array of costly 
regulations. Achieving this requires the adoption of assumptions 
that are dubious on economic grounds. The parties who developed 
the analysis being employed are not engaged in subterfuge; the 
entire process is above board. Rather, this Article argues that the 
process itself is deeply flawed. 
This Article examines the cost-benefit analysis process as now 
generally employed, with a focus on environmental regulations. 
The Article begins with a nuts-and-bolts overview showing that 
cost-benefit analysis requires careful work and transparency in 
assumptions made so that the analysis can stand up to critical 
review. Then, the Article looks at how the process has been 
modified in the recent years to take into account values not 
traditionally employed, particularly by assigning a value to prevent 
CO2 emissions. Finally, the Article argues that the result of the 
modification of the traditional analysis has given agencies the 
ability to set the benefits such that any rule involving reduced 
energy use can be easily justified, thereby making the exercise 
nearly meaningless. Goals that have political and social values are 
given a gloss of scientific legitimacy by asserting the legitimacy of 
contrived numbers in cost-benefit analysis. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. Executive Orders Requiring Cost-Benefit  
Presidents have imposed cost-benefit analysis requirements on 
federal agencies for decades. For instance, President Ford required 
agencies to produce “inflation impact statements” for proposed 
major rules.1 Similarly, President Carter ordered agencies to 
prepare analyses of the cost-effectiveness of alternative approaches 
for major rules.2 However, the current framework generally traces 
to President Reagan who required agencies, except for independent 
regulatory agencies, to produce studies when benefits exceeded 
costs and perform these studies for all rules likely to result in an 
impact on the economy greater than $100 million per year.3  
In 1993, President Clinton revoked Reagan’s order, but 
imposed a replacement requiring quantification of costs and 
benefits and consideration of qualitative measures.4 Again, rules 
imposing a cost of $100 million a year or more were subject to the 
requirement, as well as certain other situations, particularly where 
conflicts between agencies were created by new rules or where 
“novel legal or policy issues” arose from a mandate.5 For 
significant regulatory actions, agencies must provide the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), within the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), an “assessment of the potential 
costs and benefits of the regulatory action.”6  
To assist in applying the new requirement, in 1996 OIRA 
issued, via an interagency group, a document outlining “best 
practices” when preparing analyses.7 This document was replaced 
in 2003 by OMB Circular A-4 in the Bush Administration, which 
similarly instructed agencies on the analysis expected by OIRA 
under Executive Order 12866.8 To comply with Circular A-4, 
agencies must explain the problem the regulations are to address, 
the actions being taken, alternatives considered, and evaluations of 
                                                                                                             
 1. See Exec. Order No. 11,821, § 1, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501, 41,501 (Nov. 29, 
1974). 
 2. See Exec. Order No. 12,044, § 3, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,663 (Mar. 24, 
1978). 
 3. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 19, 1981). 
 4. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993).  
 5. Id. at 51,738. 
 6. Id. at 51,741. 
 7. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (1996). 
 8. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND 
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OMB CIRCULAR A-4, (2003). 
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quantitative and qualitative costs and benefits.9 Finally, under the 
Obama administration in 2010, the OMB refined Circular A-4.10 In 
2011, President Obama issued Executive Order 13563,11 which is 
similar to earlier orders because it instructs regulators to propose 
and adopt rules upon a determination that the benefits justify the 
costs and to select approaches that maximize net benefits.12  
B. EPA Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Section 812 of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) 
shows the complexities involved in a cost-benefit (C-B) analysis.13 
It requires the EPA to periodically reassess costs and benefits of 
the rules implemented under the Clean Air Act.14 Assessments 
involve a series of studies and subsequent interpretation of the 
results of the studies.15 The EPA is obligated to consult a review 
committee composed of outside experts (the Council).16 To date, 
the EPA has released three Section 812 reports that provide 
insights into the steps the EPA employs in C-B analysis 
preparation.17  
The first report, The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act: 
1970 to 1990, commonly known as the Retrospective Study, was 
completed in 1997.18 The study evaluated costs and benefits of the 
                                                                                                             
 9. Id. 
 10. This included, in 2010, a checklist for regulatory impact analysis. OFFICE OF 
MGMT. & BUDGET, AGENCY CHECKLIST: REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS (2010), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/regpol/RIA 
Checklist.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G8JR-XDL6. 
 11. Exec. Order 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011). See also Exec. 
Order 13,579, 76 Fed. Reg. 41,587 (July 14, 2011) (supplementing Exec. Order 
13,563 and encouraging independent agencies to use similar methodology). 
Various statutes have been enacted over time that come into play. See, e.g., 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 
(1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–47) (imposing environmental 
impact studies on all major federal actions that impact the human environment 
and applying to independent regulatory agencies, unlike EO 13563). 
 12. Compare 76 Fed. Reg. at 3,821 with 76 Fed. Reg. at 41,587.  
 13. Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/, archived at http://perma.cc/SZ6R-2EY2 (last 
updated Aug. 15, 2013). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT FROM 1990 TO 2020 1-14 (2011) [hereinafter BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 
2020], available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/feb11/fullreport_rev_a.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6RTD-3JCH. 
 17. Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act, supra note 13. 
 18. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR 
ACT, 1970 TO 1990 (1997). 
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regulatory requirements of the 1970 Act and subsequent 1977 
Amendments up to the 1990 CAAA. The report concluded that, 
from 1970 to 1990, the benefits of the Clean Air Act exceeded the 
costs by a factor ranging from 10 to 100.19 The second report, The 
Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act: 1990 to 2010, commonly 
referred to as the First Prospective Study, was published in 1999.20 
It estimated costs and benefits of the implementation of the 1990 
CAAA through 2010 and concluded that the benefits of the 
Amendments exceeded costs by a factor of four.21 The third report, 
The Benefits and Costs of the Clean Air Act from 1990 to 2020, 
also known as the Second Prospective Study, was finalized in 
April 2011.22 In this report, the benefits of the 1990 CAAA were 
estimated to exceed the costs by a factor of more than 30 to 1.23 
The report also provides an overview of the timeline of the studies 
and the general impact on emissions, actual or presumed, under the 
statutes, compared to the level of emissions that would have 
existed in the absence of the regulatory regime.24 
Over the years, the EPA developed regulatory impact analyses 
(RIAs) to evaluate potential social costs and benefits of proposals 
to individual regulation, including costs and benefits that 
traditionally cannot be quantified and expressed in monetary 
terms.25 The Second Prospective Study, which assesses health, 
                                                                                                             
 19. Benefits over the 20-year period were estimated to be between $6 and 
$50 trillion; the costs were $523 billion. Retrospective Study - Study Design and 
Summary of Results, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/cleanairact 
benefits/design.html, archived at http://perma.cc/P675-TSRC (last updated Aug. 
15, 2014). 
 20. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2010 (1999), 
available at http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/1990-2010/chap1130.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7XDR-EYWK. 
 21. Id. at iii. Benefits were estimated to be $110 billion; costs about $27 
billion.  
 22. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16.  
 23. Later in the paper we discuss the generation of this amazing increase in 
benefits. 
 24. See BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 1-3, Figure 1-
1, Clean Air Act Section 812 Scenarios: Conceptual Schematic, (The “with-
CAAA” scenario tracks compliance with 1990 CAAA rules through September 
2005. The “without-CAAA” scenario freezes emissions controls at the 1990 
levels, allowing for changes in population and economic activity.). See also 
James H. Wilson et al., Emission Projections for the Clean Air Act Second 
Section 812 Prospective Analysis, 58 J. AIR & WASTE MGMT. ASSOC. 657, 663 
(2008). 
 25. See, e.g., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR 
THE PROPOSED CARBON POLLUTION GUIDELINES FOR EXISTING POWER PLANTS 
AND EMISSION STANDARDS FOR MODIFIED AND RECONSTRUCTED POWER 
PLANTS 1-3 (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/ecas/regdata/RIAs/111 
dproposalRIAfinal0602.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/MRC9-KGSQ. 
2014] MAKING COST-BENEFIT A POLITICAL TOOL 229 
 
 
 
welfare, ecological, and economic benefits resulting from the 1990 
CAAA programs alone, represents a broader C-B analytical 
framework.26 Rather than review all three analyses, this Article 
focuses only on the Second Prospective Study’s analysis to give an 
overview of the C-B process. Possible shortcomings will be noted 
during the discussion of the analysis, but it is used to illustrate a 
carefully constructed work.  
II. C-B ANALYSIS IN THE SECOND PROSPECTIVE STUDY 
The Second Prospective Study created two scenarios: one with 
Clean Air Act Amendments (with-CAAA) and one without Clean 
Air Act Amendments (without-CAAA).27 The baseline scenario is 
with-CAAA, which assumes all federal, state, and local air 
pollution controls are fully implemented.28 This baseline scenario 
is subsequently juxtaposed against the counterfactual without-
CAAA scenario, in which air pollutant standards remain at 1990 
levels.29 Oddly, in its reliance on the population estimates provided 
by the Census Bureau,30 the analysis assumes identical geographic 
population and economic activity distributions for both scenarios.31 
A review of the steps needed to complete the C-B analysis in the 
Second Prospective Study are summarized in Figure 1-2 of the 
report. 32 
A. Modeling Air Pollutant Emissions 
The first step in the analytical sequence is to model emissions 
of the major air pollutants.33 This model tracks the changes in the 
                                                                                                             
 26. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 1-5. 
 27. Id. at 1-6. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id.  
 30. Id. at 1-7. 
 31. It is dubious to assume that some health-concerned residents would not 
leave the areas with continuously declining air quality; hence, to assume that 
economic activity in most polluted areas would remain constant is doubtful. 
Professor Revesz helped put to bed the notion that jurisdictions might fall into a 
race to the environmental bottom in an effort to attract industry. See generally 
Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the ‘Race to 
the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulations, 67 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1210 (1992). Nevertheless, for analysts to assume some migration from 
more polluted areas would be a major undertaking that could also be criticized. 
 32. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 1-8, Figure 1-2, 
Analytic Sequence For The Second Prospective Analysis. 
 33. Id. at 2-1. Emissions analysis is focused on six major pollutants 
regulated by the 1990 CAAA: volatile organic compounds (VOCs), nitrogen 
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level of emissions over time in both with-CAAA and without-
CAAA scenarios.34 A three-step model was deemed suitable for all 
major source categories, except electricity-generating units 
(EGUs): 
1. Construction of emissions inventory to serve as a base for 
the projections; 
2. Projection of emissions for the without-CAAA scenario for 
three target years (2000, 2010, 2020); and 
3. Construction of the with-CAAA estimates for the same three 
target years under the same set of economic activity 
projections.35 
Emissions for EGUs were estimated with the help of the Integrated 
Planning Model36 via special optimization procedure.37  
Both scenarios, with-CAAA and without-CAAA, have distinct 
base years.38 The year 1990 was selected as the base year for the 
without-CAAA scenario, based on the logic that this scenario 
should effectively restrict pollution controls to the 1990 level.39 On 
the other hand, given that the with-CAAA scenario was designed 
to estimate the impact of compliance with the CAAA over time, 
the base year should allow for tracking of emissions since 1990 
and take into account decisions made to comply with the CAAA; 
hence, the year 2000 was selected.40 
In modeling the air pollutant emissions, a general approach was 
adopted. Emission factors41 were multiplied by the level of the 
                                                                                                             
 
oxides (NOx), sulfur dioxide (SO2), carbon monoxide (CO), particulate matter 
(PM10) and fine particulate matter (PM2.5). 
 34. Id. at 2-2. Projections were made for five major source categories: 
electricity generating units (EGUs), non-EGU industrial sources, on-road motor 
vehicles, other non-on-road engines/vehicles, and the last, smallest category, of 
area sources. 
 35. This part assumes regulatory stringency and timing consistent with 
EPA’s CAAA implementation plan as of late 2005. Id. at 1-7. 
 36. Id. at 2-3 (the process was developed by ICF Consulting for EPA). 
 37. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 2-3. This 
procedure takes into consideration additional factors such as costs of electricity 
generation, costs of pollution controls, external projections of electricity 
demand, and pollution control methods. 
 38. Id. at 2-3. 
 39. Id. at 2-3. 
 40. It was less problematic to apply two distinct base years instead of basing 
projections on recent emissions and subsequently trying to simulate effects of 
removing CAAA emission controls in place. Id. 
 41. Derived from base year emissions estimates. 
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activity42 generating emissions. A major challenge that required 
much deeper consideration was the projection of economic 
growth,43 which entered the model in three instances: 
1. Forecast of electricity demand; 
2. Forecast of fuel consumption for non-utility sectors; and 
3. Projections of economic growth serving as activity drivers.44 
To model economic growth45 in both scenarios, an approach46 was 
adopted that took into account energy demand, fuel price 
projections, and other factors for each of the five source categories 
required by the CAAA.47  
B. Estimation of Costs  
Compliance with the CAAA is expensive. The cost affects all 
levels of the economy, including industrial production, research 
and development, and capital investments.48 Also, there are costs 
associated with forfeited productivity, employment, and 
consumption, which arise from devoting resources to comply with 
the regulations. Nevertheless, the main focus of the Second 
Prospective Study is to estimate direct (annual) compliance costs, 
which can be attributed specifically to the 1990 CAAA.49 Cost 
analysis in the Second Prospective Study is driven by the results of 
the emission-reduction analysis, in which the authors modeled the 
                                                                                                             
 42. Emission generating activities vary by source category and generally are 
related to economic activity (e.g., transportation, energy consumption, industrial 
output, and others). THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 2-5. 
 43. Id. at 2-5. See Annual Energy Review 2005, DEP’T OF ENERGY 9 (July 
27, 2006), http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/archive/038405.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/8HQJ-DZC9. That data provided the basis for 
growth projections used by EPA.  
 44. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16 at 2-5. 
 45. Id. The Annual Energy Review applied in the analysis predates the 2008 
economic downturn, so it is likely that emission estimates were innocently 
overstated in both scenarios.  
 46. For the purpose of implementing this integrated approach, a selection was 
made to apply the Department of Energy National Energy Modeling System 
(NEMS), typically used to produce the DOE’s Annual Energy Review projections. 
See The National Energy Modeling System: An Overview, DEP’T OF ENERGY 
http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/aeo/overview/index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/8G 
KN-VTBM (last visited Oct. 3, 2014).  
 47. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16. Table 2-4, Base 
Year Emission Data Sources For The With- And Without-CAAA Scenarios 
(presenting a full list of CAAA programs modeled for each source category). 
 48. Id. at 3-1. A five percent discount rate was applied to annualize costs of 
capital expenditure over the estimated life of equipment necessary to reduce 
emissions. Id. at 3-6. 
 49. Id. at 3-2. 
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CAAA compliance costs for the three target years by comparing 
respective costs of air pollution reductions in both scenarios.50 
The Second Prospective Study identifies two cost-estimating 
methods:51 
1. Cost Estimates Based on Unit Costs;52 
2. Cost Estimates Based on Optimization.53 
In addition to the general cost estimation methods, the EPA Project 
Team took into consideration supplementary cost-saving factors 
such as “learning by doing.”54 Hence, when deemed plausible, the 
analysts applied additional cost-saving adjustments based on 
previous empirical evidence.55 Finally, all cost estimates in the 
Second Prospective Study are expressed as the total annualized 
costs, meaning these costs include all of the costs of operation, 
maintenance, and, if applicable, capital investments.56 
C. Air Quality Modeling 
Air quality modeling links changes in emissions to changes in 
the atmospheric concentrations of the pollutants. The focus is on 
what is achieved in both scenarios by estimating impact emissions 
on ambient concentrations of ozone, Particulate Matter, PM10 and 
PM2.5, acid deposition, and visibility for each of the target years.57 
To simulate physical and chemical processes governing the 
formation, transport, and deposition of gaseous and particulate 
species, EPA analysts relied on the Community Multi-scale Air 
                                                                                                             
 50. Id. Except for few instances in which direct costs are derived 
concurrently with pollutant emission reductions. Id. at 3-3. 
 51. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 3-1. See also id. 
at Table 3-1 at 3-5 (summarizing cost estimation methods applied to each source 
category and organized by major rules within each category). 
 52. Id. at 3-3. This method estimates costs by collecting information on the 
costs associated with specific control measures required by CAAA regulations.  
 53. Id. In this approach costs were estimated concurrently with emissions 
through a cost-minimizing algorithm with specified emissions’ reduction targets. 
In this approach, costs were estimated concurrently with emissions through a 
cost-minimizing algorithm with specified emissions’ reduction targets.  
 54. Id. at 3-4. Literature suggests that cost per unit of production, when 
using a given technology, declines as experience with that technology increases 
over time. See Dennis Epple et al., Organizational Learning Curves: A Method 
for Investigating Intra-plant Transfer of Knowledge Acquired Through Learning 
by Doing, 2 ORG. SCI. 58, 58–59 (1991). 
 55. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 3-6. The Council 
recommended applying a default-learning rate of five to ten percent to sectors 
for which no empirical data are available. Id. at n.22.  
 56. Id. at 3-6.  
 57. Id. at 4-2. 
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Quality (CMAQ) model.58 This model allows for the determination 
of the magnitude, temporal variation, and spatial distribution of the 
ozone and particulate concentrations in the atmosphere, along with 
the timing and distributions to the earth’s surface.59 The CMAQ 
model is critical to the Prospective Study because the outputs 
derived from the CMAQ Model form the foundation upon which 
ecological and health benefits are calculated.60 
D. Economic Valuation of Human Health 
In terms of the health-benefits analysis, the EPA’s standard 
practice is to calibrate CMAQ results and not use them directly.61 
Development and application of the calibration factors is done 
either with the use of the Modeled Attainment Test Software 
(MATS)62 or by applying an inverse distance squared weighting 
procedure called Enhanced Voronoi Neighbor Averaging 
(EVNA).63  
In the next step of the analytical sequence, the Second 
Prospective Study applies various models to estimate the expected 
reduction in the rates of adverse health occurrences that serve as a 
                                                                                                             
 58. Id. Emissions data are processed as input to the CMAQ using the Sparse-
Matrix Operator Kernel Emissions (SMOKE) processing system. See Marc R. 
Houyoux et al., EPA’s New Emissions Modeling Framework, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/conference/ei14/session11/houyoux.pdf 
archived at http://perma.cc/NN2R-KRQY (last visited Oct. 3, 2014). For a more 
recent overview, see EPA, Research in Action: Community Multi-scale Air Quality 
Model (CMAQ), ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/AMD /Research 
/RIA/cmaq.html, archived at http://perma.cc/H3J3-UPRL (last updated June 30, 
2014).  
 59. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 4-5. 
 60. Id. at 4-3. The CMAQ model was applied to produce twenty-one 
simulations with pollutants of interest including ozone and fine particulate 
matter (PM2.5). 
 61. Id. This process is called “monitor and model relative adjustment,” 
which is a calibration procedure sometimes applied to correct for inconsistencies 
in the CMAQ output. Here, the adjustment was applied to correct for 
inaccuracies in fine particulate matter emission estimates. Id. at 4-7. 
 62. See Abt Associates, Modeled Attainment Test Software User’s Manual 
(June 2010), http://www.epa.gov/scram001/guidance/guide/MATS-2-3-1_man 
ual.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CLL6-CRQW. To see the effect of the 
MATS procedure, see BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 4-9 
to 4-10, Tables 4-3 and 4-4.  
 63. Guidance on the Use of Models and Other Analyses in Attainment 
Demonstrations for the 8-hour Ozone NAAQS, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY 20 (Oct. 
2005), http://purl.access.gpo.gov/GPO/LPS67873, archived at http://perma 
.cc/BB5C-WQT8.  
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base for deriving the economic impact on health.64 The Second 
Prospective Study focuses primarily on health benefits65 attributed 
to the improved air quality.66 The valuation analysis is comprised 
of a sequence of linked analytical models67 designed to estimate 
health benefits. It involves three key steps: 
1. Estimating exposure of individuals to air pollutants;68 
2. Estimating human response to exposure; and 
3. Valuing avoided human health risk.69 
A central tool of the health-benefits analysis is the 
Environmental Benefits Mapping and Analysis Program 
(BenMAP), developed and maintained by the EPA’s Office of Air 
and Radiation.70 BenMAP accepts a range of air quality inputs and 
is widely regarded as a tool capable of performing a quality 
exposure analysis.71 The inputs loaded to BenMAP include:72 
1. Forecast changes in air quality from the without-CAAA to 
the with-CAAA scenarios for all three target years 2000, 2010, 
and 2020; 
                                                                                                             
 64. The analysis applies nationally representative age-specific incidence 
rates obtained from CDC and National Center for Health Statistics and 
American Lung Association. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra 
note 16, at 5-5. 
 65. Id. at 5-1. Health benefits are typically expressed as avoided cases of air 
pollution related health effects, such as premature mortality, heart disease and 
respiratory illness.  
 66. Id. at 5-6. Focus is on human health effects associated with reduced 
exposure to fine particulate matter (PM2.5) and ozone, as these are the largest 
contributors to the overall health benefits estimates. For the summary of the 
Human Health Effects of ozone and PM2.5. See also id. at Table 5-1.  
 67. Id. at 5-1. Models include forecasts of implementation activities under 
the 1990 CAAA, estimates of the pollutant emissions, and modeling of the air 
quality or both scenarios.  
 68. Exposure measures used in epidemiological studies used to derive 
human response are typically based on outdoor exposure. BenMAP (discussed 
immediately below) incorporates 2000 U.S. Census Bureau block-group 
population data to determine specific population potentially affected by ozone 
and PM2.5. 
 69. Valuation is accomplished by application of estimates from the 
literature to characterize unit values per illness incident avoided. BENEFITS AND 
COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16 at 5-2. 
 70. Id. See also BenMAP User’s Manual and Appendices, ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY (Sept. 2008), http://www.epa.gov/air/sect812/dec09/BenMAPappend 
icesSept08.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/KP3L-TDAD. 
 71. Exposure analysis includes calibration of model results to monitor data 
for historical years, assessing the changes in health effects’ incidence resulting 
from those exposures, and estimating monetized value of those avoided health 
effects. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16 at 5-2.  
 72. Id. at 5-3. 
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2. Health impact functions that quantify the relationship 
between the forecasted changes in exposure and expected 
changes in adverse health effects; 73 and 
3. Health valuation functions that assign a monetary value to 
changes in specific health effects.74  
The output from BenMAP results in central estimates, distribution 
of the incidence of health effects, and valuation at the national and 
county level for each of the three target years of analysis. 75 
E. Aggregations of Results 
Aggregation of the results over the entire 30-year period 
involved interpolating the benefit values, which would be realized 
in the years between the target years (2000, 2010, and 2020) by 
matching a trend in the emission reductions for PM precursors76 
and subsequently discounting the stream of monetized benefits to 
the 1990 value with a five percent discount rate.77 Consistency in 
the approach applied to both scenarios (with-CAAA and without-
CAAA) for all three target years allowed a direct comparison of 
the monetized benefits to the estimated costs in the C-B analysis.78 
                                                                                                             
 73. Id. at 5-4. Health impact functions estimate the change in health 
endpoint of interest (e.g., hospital admissions) for a given change in ambient 
pollutant concentration. Typical function will have four components: (1) the size 
of potentially affected population, (2) a baseline incidence rate for health effect 
(obtained from a source of public health statistics such as CDC), (3) 
concentration-response (C-R) function (derived from epidemiological studies), 
and (4) estimated change in relevant pollutant concentration.  
 74. Id. at 5-16. Health valuation functions are based on assumption that a 
dollar required to compensate a person for exposure to an adverse effect should 
roughly be the same as a dollar a person is willing to pay to avoid that adverse 
effect.  
 75. Id. at 5-24. Estimates imply 230,000 cases of avoided deaths, which can 
be valued at $1.8 trillion in 2006 dollars. For more detail related to avoided 
annual incidence of health effects and associated monetary valuation, see id. at 
5-25, Table 5-6, Mean CAAA-Related Avoided Annual Incidence Of Health 
Effects And Associated Monetary Valuation In 2000, 2010, and 2020.  
 76. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 7-2. At the same 
time implying that a reduction in ambient PM particles is the driving force 
behind majority of monetized benefits. 
 77. Id. at 7-7, Table 7-3, Present Value of Monetized Benefits of the 
CAAA. 
 78. Estimates rely on particular sets of data, models and assumptions. It is 
likely that other models, using other sets of data and assumptions would yield 
different estimates of benefits and costs, but the assumptions and data used in 
the models here can be easily justified. 
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F. Uncertainty Analyses 
The combination of the expected impact of the 1990 CAAA on 
the economy, combined with the complexity of the Second 
Prospective Study, requires care in addressing sources of 
uncertainty in the key analytic outcomes of the study.79 With the 
advice of the National Research Council,80 the Project Team 
developed a three-step approach to address uncertainty in its 
analysis:  
1. Identify sources of uncertainty for each analytical step; 
2. Quantify parameter and model uncertainty;81 and 
3. Compare results of alternative analyses to the primary results.82 
To identify important sources of uncertainty, a working 
definition of a major uncertainty factor was developed.83 To be 
considered major, an uncertainty factor had to meet two 
conditions. First, a plausible alternative assumption or approach 
would have to exist for this factor. Second, the factor would have 
to have the potential to alter the overall estimates by five percent or 
more.84  
Several factors could affect direct cost estimates by a 
significant percentage;85 however, as the authors assert, no cost 
estimation uncertainty has the potential to double the current total 
cost estimate of $65 billion or to reduce the cost estimate to $0 or 
less,86 constituting the required magnitude of five percent of the 
                                                                                                             
 79. For further discussion on the characterization of the uncertainty surrounding 
economic valuation, see generally Uncertainty Analyses to Support the Second 
Section 812 Benefit-Cost Analysis of the Clean Air Act, INDUS. ECON. (2010), http: 
/www.epa.gov/cleanairactbenefits/may10/IEc_Uncertainty.pdf, archived at http://per 
a.cc/P2NS-KYH3 [hereinafter, Uncertainty Analyses].  
 80. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE PUBLIC HEALTH BENEFITS 
OF PROPOSED AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS 146–48 (2002), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=10511&page=126, archived at 
http://perma.cc/38NX-A5HL. 
 81. Uncertainty modeling requires use of alternative assumptions and/or 
models to re-estimate intermediate and/or overall net benefits results. 
 82. See, e.g., Uncertainty Analyses, supra note 79.  
 83. To be considered “major,” an expected impact of uncertainty was 
assessed to be approximately $100 billion to affect net benefits estimates by as 
much as five percent. THE BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16 at 
11-12.  
 84. Id. at 7-12. 
 85. Id. at 7-5. A good example of uncertainty involves estimating NAAQS 
compliance, especially in the case when known emissions reduction measures 
would not be sufficient to achieve full compliance with the standard in the 
future.  
 86. Id. at 7-12.  
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net benefit estimate.87 Conversely, there are several uncertainties 
with the potential to affect benefits estimates88 that have an impact 
of $100 billion or more.89 Examination of the sources of 
uncertainty suggests limited ability to estimate the joint effect of 
these factors on the direction of potential bias for net benefits.90 
Interestingly though, 7 of 13 discussed factors listed in the analysis 
have an indeterminate direction of effect.91 Such a large number of 
factors with an indeterminate direction imply that the direction of 
the net effect of all factors taken together remains unclear. 
III. EXPANDING C-B ANALYSIS 
The steps described above indicate a carefully constructed 
analysis consistent with good C-B practices. As in any area of 
inquiry, controversy abounds and experts argue about preferred 
methodology.92 For example, putting a price on life raises ethical 
issues. However, in a world of limited resources, it is best that 
decision makers take into account alternatives to generate the best 
value from the resources being directed and thereby avoid costly 
rules that provide minimal benefit compared to more efficacious 
alternatives.  
A. Limits of C-B Analysis 
Kip Viscusi, a professor of law, economics, and management, 
compiled the estimated regulatory cost per life saved for assorted 
regulations as of 1991 and showed that the cost per life “saved” by 
some regulations ran into the trillions of dollars.93 If the goal is 
efficient allocation of resources, the EPA and OSHA tend to 
produce the worst bang for the buck, while home and highway 
safety tend to be more cost-effective. Justice Breyer, prior to his 
                                                                                                             
 87. Id.  
 88. BENEFITS AND COSTS 1990 TO 2020, supra note 16, at 7-11. Examples 
of such would involve forecasting errors, especially in regard to estimating 
future economic and regulatory activity as well as estimating behavior under the 
counterfactual without-CAAA scenario.  
 89. Id. at 7-12. 
 90. Id. at 7-11, Table 7-6 Potentially Major Sources of Uncertainty for 
Estimating the Costs and Benefits of the CAAA. 
 91. Id.  
 92. To lay persons it may seem arcane, but, as discussed, a change of one 
assumption can greatly affect the outcome of the analysis.  
 93. W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 843, 857 (2000). 
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Supreme Court appointment, wrote about such waste in regulation 
citing Superfund as an example.94 
Other problems that occur in economic valuation have been 
explored. For example: 
1. Measuring willingness to pay for safety measures is 
extraordinarily difficult, as the wording of the question about a 
risk will result in wide variations in value;95  
2. The values people are alleged to place on knowing of the 
existence of something, such as endangered species, are very 
difficult to believe to be meaningful;96  
3. Some real values have no logical price, such as “the 
freedoms that people enjoy” that would be restricted by 
regulation;97  
4. Pricing the possible impact of actions today on future 
generations is plausible,98 but once discount rates are applied to 
events that may occur decades or centuries from now, the 
uncertainty about changes in technology are taken into account, 
and the likelihood of substantively criticized environmental 
models being accurate is recognized, policy actions today that 
cost more than a pittance are difficult to justify; and 
5. Risk preferences and moral hazards are difficult to build into 
cost-benefit calculations.99 
                                                                                                             
 94. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION (Michael Aronson ed., 1993). Justice Breyer provided, 
among other examples, a Superfund site where $9.3 million was spent “to 
protect non-existent dirt-eating children.” Id. at 12. 
 95. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) 
(providing an overview of perception biases based on information presentation). 
See also RICHARD THALER, PRECOMMITMENT AND THE VALUE OF A LIFE 17–18 
(1981) (providing an example in which the median value attached to avoiding a 
specific risk changed from $800 to $100,000 depending on how the question 
was phrased).  
 96. Donald J. Boudreaux et al., Talk Is Cheap: The Existence Value Fallacy, 
29 ENVTL. L. 765, 768 (1999). See also Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, 
Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1117 (2000).  
 97. Amartya Sen, The Discipline of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 931, 944 (2000). 
 98. John Broome, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Population, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
953, 954 (2000). To illustrate this principle, the example of global warming is 
posed—what if we think there could be catastrophic events in 50 years for 
actions taken today. Id. at 955.  
 99. See generally Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1037 (2000) (discussing and providing examples of 
these issues).  
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B. Benefits of C-B Analysis 
Despite acknowledged limitations, C-B analysis is commonly 
employed. As Nobel laureate Gary Becker argues, it serves a 
productive role “against misleading information spread by self-
interested political pressure groups” that lobby for economically 
destructive activities or for limits on actions that may have net 
benefits.100 This Article argues that some novel calculations now 
included in C-B analysis threaten to make the analysis 
meaningless, as they are increasingly driven by political values. 
Before serving as administrator of OIRA in the first Obama 
term, Professor Sunstein was enthusiastic about the use of C-B 
analysis. Agencies are too responsive to populist ideas about risk 
that may be disconnected from reality. Consequently, governments 
often make “misinformed judgments” that squander lives and 
money.101 He saw C-B analysis as a tool capable of going beyond 
mundane accounting of relatively straightforward, generally 
measurable costs and benefits to serving as a “spur to 
regulation.”102 Fully formed C-B analysis could help people 
overcome irrational fears and biases.  
Next, a discussion on how C-B analysis has developed in 
recent years, in part under Sunstein’s guidance. Sunstein employs 
dubious measures of value to justify regulations that would be 
unjustifiable if analysts stuck with best-known measures of 
quantifiable costs and benefits based on market values and 
scientific evidence. 
IV. COSTS AND BENEFITS OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATIONS IN 
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
As noted earlier, under the guidance of OIRA, agencies are 
required to perform a C-B analysis of “economically significant” 
regulations, meaning those estimated by the issuing agency to have 
a cost equal to or greater than $100 million.103 In 2013, there were 
                                                                                                             
 100. Gary S. Becker, A Comment on the Conference on Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1149, 1152 (2000). Judge Posner agrees that C-B 
analysis helps “to introduce market principles into government,” which he 
thinks is sensible. Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, 
Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 
1159 (2000). 
 101. Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1059, 1063 (2000). 
 102. Id. at 1071. 
 103. 2013 Draft Report to Congress on the Benefits and Costs of Federal 
Regulations and Agency Compliance with the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, 
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224 such regulations in the pipeline, which constituted about five 
percent of all rules under consideration.104  
If the analysis shows a net benefit from a new rule, who can 
object? For example, in 2013, OIRA asserted that from 2002 to 
2012 the average annual cost of compliance with major federal 
regulations was in the range of $57 billion to $84 billion. The 
benefits were many times greater, running somewhere from $193 
to $800 billion a year.105 That is, benefits were 3.4 to 14 times 
greater than costs.  
Overall, direct business compliance costs for environmental 
regulations were estimated to be $183 billion in 2008, plus another 
$98 billion, which was passed on to the non-business sector.106 
Regulatory burdens typically fall hardest on manufacturing, 
utilities, mining, and transportation—all energy intensive 
sectors.107 Firms in these industries have more than triple the 
compliance cost per worker than health sector workers.108 When 
firms face significant burdens not faced by producers in other 
countries, they tend to shift their operations to foreign locations to 
reduce costs.  
Next, this Article will review the effects of recent regulations 
on both a small industry with a single product and a large industry 
to illustrate how regulations directly impact the economy at 
different levels. Additionally, this Article will look at how 
associated costs are easily justified by asserting benefits to be 
unusually high by historical standards. The basis for the high 
benefits arises from the inclusion of non-market values. 
                                                                                                             
 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET 10 (2013) [hereinafter, 2013 Draft Report to 
Congress], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb 
/inforeg/2013_cb/draft_2013_cost_benefit_report.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/8KR5-K774.  
 104. CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN 
ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 3 (2013).  
 105. 2013 Draft Report to Congress, supra note 103, at 3. 
 106. NICOLE V. CRAIN & W. MARK CRAIN, THE IMPACT OF REGULATORY 
COSTS ON SMALL FIRMS 48 (2010). This estimate does not include the cost of 
compliance with state regulations, which could “add to the nation’s total 
regulatory compliance burden.” Id. at 14.  
 107. Id. at 40 (citing Michael Hazilla & Raymond Kopp, The Social Cost of 
Environmental Quality Regulations: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 858 (1990)). 
 108. Id. at 51–52. 
2014] MAKING COST-BENEFIT A POLITICAL TOOL 241 
 
 
 
A. Impact on a Small Industry: Cement 
Cement manufacturing in the United States directly employs 
about 12,000 people, and sales of domestically produced cement 
were about $6.6 billion in 2011.109 Domestic cement use averages 
about 100 million metric tons per year.110 When demand runs high, 
imports fill the gap. The United States is a small player in the 
world market, accounting for about two percent of global 
production.111 Not surprisingly, China dominates with more than 
half of global production, however, cement is made virtually 
everywhere as the inputs are common and transportation costs are 
substantial.  
Hazardous emissions from Portland cement production are 
regulated under Subpart LLL of the National Emission Standards 
for Hazardous Air Pollutants (NESHAP), within the Clean Air 
Act.112 Recently, the EPA issued a new maximum achievable 
control technology (MACT) standard to apply to all kilns in the 
country.113 The new “floor” standard for emissions is equal to the 
emission reduction already achieved “by the best performing 12 
percent of the existing sources.”114 This standard applies to all 
existing facilities. New facilities would have to meet a more 
stringent New Source Performance Standard (NSPS), which is 
considered to be “the best system of emission reduction” the EPA 
identifies.115 New plants would cost an estimated $600 million 
each, thereby driving up the cost of domestic production. As 
producers in China and other countries need not comply with 
costly regulations imposed on United States producers, buyers are 
likely to increasingly favor less costly imports.116 
                                                                                                             
 109. See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 
2012 38 (2012), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2012 
/mcs2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/L4Q4-N5PY.  
 110. See id. Consumption dropped between 2007 and 2011 to about 70 
million tons due to the economic slowdown. See id.  
 111. Id. at 39. 
 112. Clean Air Act, 40 C.F.R. § 63.1340 (2014). 
 113. The new rule, as it affects cement, was proposed in 2009 and published 
in 2010 with various compliance dates through 2014. The industry sued to block 
the rule, while environmental groups demanded more. Essentially, the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the EPA position. See generally 
Portland Cement Ass’n. v. EPA, 665 F.3d 177 (2011). 
 114. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(3)(A) (2012). 
 115. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1). 
 116. Market Intelligence, PORTLAND CEMENT ASSOC. 6 (Apr. 29, 2013) (on 
file with author). For a general discussion of the impact of the NESHAP rule, 
see Bernard L. Weinstein, Economic Impacts of Cement Industry Regulations: 
The Proposed Portland Cement NESHAP Rule, SMU COX MAGUIRE ENERGY 
INST., (Feb. 2010), http://www.cox.smu.edu/c/document _library/get_file?p_l_id 
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In its C-B analysis, the EPA asserted that annualized 
compliance costs for existing facilities to meet MACT would be 
$368 million (2005 dollars). Consequently, 8% of domestic cement 
industry jobs would be lost,117 average firm revenues would fall by 
4%, domestic production would fall 8%, imports would increase 
by two million metric tons, some small plants would close, the 
price of domestic cement would rise 4%, and domestic industry net 
revenue would decline by 16%.118 The EPA estimated social costs 
to total $605 million, about two-thirds of which would be borne by 
cement users as a result of higher prices (a loss of consumer 
surplus) and one-third would result from losses suffered by 
domestic producers (a loss of producer surplus).119  
However, the EPA estimated that the total costs would be 
offset by the benefits which, when fully implemented, would total 
between $4.4 and $11 billion (at a three percent discount rate), 
yielding a net benefit between $3.7 and $11 billion.120 The benefits 
would result from a decline in mortality and morbidity from a 
reduction in PM2.5 and SO2.121 Why is there such a large range in 
estimated benefits? The lower and higher estimates are based on 
different models of health impacts. The lower bound estimate is 
derived from a nine-page 2002 study (the Pope study); the higher 
bound is derived from a five-page 2006 study (the Laden study).122 
                                                                                                             
 
=68463&folderId=229433&name=DLFE-3104.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc 
/S2UA-8Q7Z. 
 117. This estimate may be low, as employment fell more than 8% between 2009 
and 2011 after having already fallen 20% the previous year when construction 
dropped in the recession. Payroll similarly declined. As construction was no longer 
in decline by 2011, the decline may be due to implementation of the rule. See 2011 
Annual Survey of Manufactures, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://factfinder2.census.gov 
faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?pid=ASM_2011_31GS101&prodT
ype=table, archived at http://perma.cc/PY6A-RSBQ. See also 2009 Annual Survey 
of Manufacturers, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/table 
services/jsf/pages/product view.xhtml?pid=ASM_2009_31GS101&prodType=table, 
archived at http://perma.cc/78RM-ZT5D . 
 118. Regulatory Impact Analysis: National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Portland Cement Manufacturing Industry, 
Final Report, ENVTL PROT. AGENCY 1-1 (Apr. 2009), [hereinafter, Regulatory 
Impact Analysis], http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/portlandcementria 
_4-20-09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/U8PY-3RPZ .  
 119. Id. at 3-13. 
 120. Id. at 1-2. Given the cost discussion, the final $11 billion figure should 
probably be $10 billion.  
 121. Id. at 5-1. 
 122. Id. (referring to Francine Laden et al., Reduction in Fine Particulate Air 
Pollution and Mortality, 173 AM, J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 667 
(2006) and C. Arden Pope, Lung Cancer, Cardiopulmonary Mortality, and 
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Even assuming these estimates represent the best available 
research, it is problematic for decisions of such magnitude to be 
based on hypothetical values derived from two limited studies.123 
Small changes in the assumptions could shift the benefits to be 
below the cost estimates or even greater than the higher bound 
benefit estimate reported.  
One consequence of the more costly regulation of United 
States cement production is that foreign producers may gain a 
larger share of the United States market.124 As in many other 
industries, the market share for imports rises as domestic capital 
costs are forced up by rules that do not apply to cement producers 
in China and other countries, which are happy to sell into the 
United States market.125 Thus, one predictable result of the EPA’s 
imposition of additional costs on United States producers is that 
United States consumers will purchase more foreign cement that 
has a greater negative impact on air quality than domestically 
produced cement.  
The EPA’s environmental analysis fails to include the 
environmental cost of moving production to China and other 
countries. This seems peculiar given the focus on the benefit of 
reduction in emissions. Cement delivered from China is estimated 
to produce 25% higher CO2 emissions than for the same quantity 
of cement produced in the United States. A Department of Energy 
(DOE) report concurred that Chinese cement production produces 
more emissions than current production methods in the United 
States.126 While, as discussed below, the cost of carbon is now 
routinely included in the cost of emissions, the fact that higher 
levels of emissions go into the atmosphere when production shifts 
from the United States to foreign sources was not taken into 
account. 
                                                                                                             
 
Long-term Exposure to Fine Particulate Air Pollution, 287 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
1132 (2002)).  
 123. A choice must be made when using a number in such calculations, but 
choices of work not representative of existing research can substantially skew 
the final result one way or another. See generally SUSAN DUDLEY, Perpetuating 
Puffery: An Analysis of the Composition of OMB’s Reported Benefits of 
Regulation, 45 BUS. ECON. 165 (2012) (former OIRA Administrator Susan 
Dudley critiquing assumptions being made in the Obama OIRA). 
 124. The EPA estimates importers will gain a net $89 million. See 
Regulatory Impact Analysis, supra note 118, at 3-13. 
 125. For a discussion, see Weinstein, supra note 116. 
 126. For a discussion, see Ragnar Lofstedt, EPA’s Proposed NESHAP for 
Portland Cement: Ignoring the Risk-Risk Tradeoff 11 (2010), https://cement.org 
/newsroom/Kings_College/Kings_College_Study.pdf, archived at http://perma 
.cc/Z3LE-YUR8. 
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In the EPA’s view, as properly “proven” by the cost-benefit 
analysis required by Congress, the national economy has improved 
by as much as $10 billion per year, despite shrinkage of the 
domestic industry in favor of increased imports and the loss of 
domestic producer and consumer surplus. Applying that value to 
the future cement industry, the EPA claims to have increased the 
real value of the industry from about $10 billion a year to $20 
billion a year despite the loss of profits and production. National 
income accounting is not done by adding imputed or asserted 
values, such as dollars for tons of CO2 emitted or not emitted; 
nevertheless, the EPA and other agencies apply a cost-benefit 
analysis by placing dollar values on things not measured in the 
economy, such as the imputed value of carbon not emitted.127 
B. Impact on a Common Product: Microwave Ovens 
Many companies make microwave ovens. In 1967 the Amana 
Radarange sold for $495.128 Despite being condemned as unsafe by 
Consumer Reports, they were popular and sales grew rapidly.129 
Competition and technical improvements brought the price down, 
so a product once thought to be only for the relatively wealthy is 
now available to virtually everyone. While today small models can 
be bought for around $60, this price will increase. 
In 2014, the DOE issued the “Energy Conservation Program: 
Energy Conservation Standards for Standby Mode and Off Mode 
for Microwave Ovens.”130 The DOE asserts that over the 30-year 
life of the rule—2016 to 2045—it will produce benefits of up to 
$3.38 billion (using a 3% discount rate).131 The corresponding cost 
to the microwave industry will be only $96.6 million, which means 
the regulation will produce 35 times more economic benefits than 
costs.132  
The cost estimate is relatively straightforward. Microwave 
ovens will be more expensive when they are retooled to consume 
less power while not in use. DOE estimates manufacturers will 
lose about seven percent of their net industry value due to higher 
                                                                                                             
 127. See, e.g., Energy Conservation Program: Energy Conservation 
Standards for Standby Mode and Off Mode for Microwave Ovens, 78 Fed. Reg. 
36,316 (June 17, 2013). 
 128. See Amana Radar Range (1967), IDSA, http://www.idsa.org/amana-
radarange-1967, archived at http://perma.cc/TTS9-UP3Y. 
 129. See STEVEN P. SCHNAARS, MANAGING IMITATION STRATEGIES 115 
(1994). 
 130. 78 Fed. Reg. 36,316. 
 131. Id. at 36,317. 
 132. Id. 
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costs and lost sales (the $96.6 million).133 According to the DOE, 
however, that loss in industry value is swamped by the benefits. 
Over 30 years, microwave users will use less electricity, translating 
into 38.11 million metric tons less of CO2 being emitted.134 While 
other emissions will also drop, a decline in other emissions is not 
where DOE sees the primary value.  
Herein lies the economic problem that impacts the validity of 
the C-B analysis. There is no price for CO2. It is clear that CO2 
emissions occur, but whether they are a problem is subject to 
debate.135 Assigning a price to a ton of CO2 gives an economic 
fiction legal credibility, and thereby has major impact.136 By 
assigning a “price” to tons of carbon, the C-B analysis assumes 
that the value of carbon not emitted is far greater than the cost of 
injury to an industry and consumers. 
C. Impact on a Large Industry: Electricity 
Coal produced half of the United States’ electricity in 2005, but 
now only produces about 40%.137 This change is largely driven by 
the EPA’s decision to impose stringent regulations that will drive 
down coal use, largely in favor of natural gas.138 Emissions are 
subject to tightening regulations, and the process seems largely 
                                                                                                             
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. at 36,317–18. 
 135. We express no opinion about the environmental impact of CO2. The 
science on the matter is uncertain. For some research that points in another 
direction and illustrates the basic uncertainties about the matter, see, e.g., Global 
Warming Caused by CFCs, Not Carbon Dioxide, Researcher Claims in 
Controversial Study, SCIENCE DAILY (May 30, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily 
.com/releases/2013/05/130530132443.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/NZ3W-
KRYS.  
 136. Even if one believes carbon loading in the atmosphere, which is 
occurring, is a serious matter, that does not address the issue that there is no 
price for carbon. Whether or not it should be subject to regulation is a policy and 
legal issue not addressed by the market or prices generated in the market. 
 137. The figure fell under 40% in 2012 but bounced back up in 2013, but the 
large drop in coal use is not likely to be reversed. See Coal regains some electric 
generation market share from natural gas, ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 23, 
1013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11391, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/9TC3-PHXU. 
 138. See, e.g., Aaron Larson, The Coal to Gas Exodus Continues, POWER 
(Jan. 23, 2014) http://www.powermag.com/the-coal-to-gas-exodus-continues 
/?hq_e=el&hq_m=2819287&hq_l=3&hq_v=87613213c8, archived at http: 
//perma.cc/Y266-ZPYS.  
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driven by concerns over coal’s contributions to greenhouse gas 
emissions that may relate to climate change.139  
A recent major rule in this regard is the Utility MACT Rule, 
also known as the Mercury and Air Toxic Standards (MATS), 
which was finalized by the EPA at the end of 2011 and updated in 
2013.140 This rule applies mainly to plants burning coal to generate 
electricity (very little oil is burned to generate electricity, but the 
rule applies to such facilities also). Coal-fuel electric generating 
units must meet the new control standard by 2015. 
What are the costs and benefits of the Utility MACT Rule? The 
EPA estimates the annual compliance cost, in 2007 dollars, to be 
$9.6 billion by 2015.141 Using the EPA and the Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) assumptions, National Economic Research 
Associates (NERA), a consulting firm employed by the coal 
industry, estimates annual compliance costs of $10.4 billion in 
2010 dollars, or about $9.9 billion in 2007 dollars, and total 
compliance costs of $94.8 billion.142 The difference in the cost 
estimates is relatively small, which is an indication that the EPA 
did quality work on that side of the equation, as it is not much 
contested by industry. The costs are significant, but there is little 
dispute about how large the costs are. To put into perspective what 
this $10 billion per year rule means in practice, it will result in coal 
plant closings affecting 23,000 MegaWatts (MWs) of electricity 
production and job losses of 180,000 to 215,000 by 2015.143  
While the cost to implement the rule is about $10 billion per 
year, the EPA reports that the “annual monetized benefits (in 
2007$ [sic]) [will be] between $37 to $90 billion using a 3% 
                                                                                                             
 139. Again, we are not qualified to make a pronouncement on climate 
change, but note the substantial skepticism about the presumed mechanism and 
threat posed by greenhouse gas emissions. See, e.g., Justin Gillis, What to Make 
of a Warming Plateau, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2013, at D3; Matt Ridley, Mind & 
Matter: Science Is About Evidence, Not Consensus, WALL ST. J., July 6, 2013, at 
C2.  
 140. Reconsideration of Certain New Sources Issues, 78 Fed. Reg. 24,073 
(2013).  
 141. ENVTL PROT. AGENCY, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE FINAL 
MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS ES-1 (2011) [hereinafter MERCURY AND 
AIR TOXICS STANDARDS], available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo 
38996/20111221MATSfinalRIA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/VLP7-Q42C. 
 142. Major EPA Regulations Affecting Coal-Fueled Electricity, AM. COAL. FOR 
CLEAN COAL ELEC. 1 (Aug. 2012), http://americaspower.org/sites/default /files/may-
issues-policies/EPA-Regulations-August-2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/6Y 
F7-E75E. 
 143. Anne E. Smith et al., An Economic Impact Analysis of EPA’s Mercury 
and Air Toxics Standards Rule, NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOC. 5 (Mar. 1, 2012), 
http://www.nera.com/content/dam/nera/publications/archive2/PUB _MATS_Rule 
_0312.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CT2F-J39W. 
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discount rate . . . .”144 The EPA asserts that the benefits are not 
theoretical, rather, the agency asserts that the benefits are 
“monetized,” meaning that they will show up in measured higher 
GDP. Since GDP is about $16 trillion, the impact of this one rule is 
asserted to add about a half a percent of GDP.145 The benefit will 
not go directly to the utility companies—they will incur higher 
costs and lower profits—but the economy at large will benefit. 
Outside of Ponzi schemes, one cannot find investments promising 
to deliver a rate of return of between 370% and 900%, year after 
year.  
Compounding the difficulty of doing standard cost and benefit 
estimation is the impact of the EPA’s “environmental justice” 
program.146 The EPA wants emission impacts estimated for 
various minority populations.147 In 2011, the Utility MACT Rule 
looked at the impact of reductions in mercury emissions on Laotian 
fishermen and Chippewa Indians, among other racial and ethnic 
groups, for the year 2016.148 While such group-specific studies 
raise the cost of analysis, they need not skew the gross value of the 
benefits of a particular rule, however, this is not the case with the 
presumption of monetization of carbon emissions. 
D. Carbon Pricing and the War on Coal via Cost-Benefit Analysis  
The Utility MACT Rule is only one of a number of rules in 
place or under development that are primarily aimed at coal-fueled 
utilities. Looking at seven rules implemented or under 
consideration by the EPA, and using the EPA and EIA’s 
assumptions, analysts for the coal industry estimate that over 20 
years, the total implementation cost in the electricity industry will 
be about $200 billion.149 Depending on the specific assumptions, 
the estimated number of jobs lost will be between 544,000 and 
                                                                                                             
 144. MERCURY AND AIR TOXICS STANDARDS, supra note 141, at ES-1. 
 145. Id. 
 146. For an overview of various elements, see ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PLAN 
EJ 2014 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/compliance/ej/resources 
/policy/plan-ej-2014/plan-ej-2011-09.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/QGT4-
KHNP. 
 147. For a general discussion of how such measures will become a routine 
part of C-B analysis, see Draft Technical Guidance for Assessing Environmental 
Justice in Regulatory Analysis, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY (2013), http://Yosemite 
.epa.gov/sab/sabproduct.nsf/0/0F7D1A0D7D15001B8525783000673AC3/$File/
EPA-HQ-OA-2013-0320-0002[1].pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CX7F-M5DP. 
 148. Id. at 7-48 and 7-49 respectively.  
 149. For a summary, see Impacts of Seven EPA Rules, AM. COAL. FOR 
CLEAN COAL ELEC. (2012), http://www.americaspower.org/sites/default/files 
/NERA-3.0-Impacts-Oct26.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/K57H-J829. 
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887,000, and much of that will be in the upper Midwest and 
Mississippi valley where the use of coal-fired power plants is 
common.150 Total loss of existing electricity facilities will be 
between 54,000 and 69,000 MWs—about 1.5% of total United 
States capacity.151 
Some existing facilities will be decommissioned, a costly 
process in itself, and capital investments must be made that will 
result in higher operating costs for existing facilities. For example, 
new natural-gas-fueled facilities will be built to replace functional 
coal-fueled plants. Crucially, these are not capital expenditures by 
firms that have independently determined that the investments are 
worthwhile based on economic considerations of rates of return, 
but instead, the expenditures are forced by regulators. Capital is 
consumed, meaning less is available for other economic uses. The 
net result is continued supply of electricity at higher cost to utility 
operators and electricity users. 
The NSPS proposed by the EPA in 2012 will likely ensure that 
new coal-fueled plants will not be built. The standards are intended 
to control CO2 emissions from new fossil-fuel-fired power plants 
by forcing a preference for natural gas.152 The industry has 
reported that the new standards mean no new coal-fired plants can 
be built. At this time, the only feasible way to meet the standards is 
to use carbon capture technology.153 This technology is being 
tested at a plant in Mississippi.154 However, as often happens with 
new technology, there have been cost overruns and multiple 
problems, so it is uncertain when the technology could be cost 
effective or even capable of being put into practice.155 In early 
2014, the DOE announced the reinvigoration of a stalled carbon 
                                                                                                             
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Withdrawal of Proposed Standards of Performance for Greenhouse Gas 
Emissions From New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 
Fed. Reg. 1,352, 1,352–53 (Jan. 8, 2014). EPA stalled implementation, perhaps 
in due to pressure from unhappy members of Congress. See Justin Martino, EPA 
delays finalizing New Source Performance Standard regulations, POWER 
ENGR. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www.power-eng.com/articles/2013/04/epa-
delays-finalizing-new-source-performance-standard-regulation.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/E2YW-2BAG. 
 153. The rule is expected to be finalized. See Major EPA Regulations 
Affecting Coal-Fueled Electricity, supra note 142, at 4–5. 
 154. For an ongoing review of the multi-billion dollar project, see Kemper 
County IGCC Fact Sheet: Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage Project, 
CARBON CAPTURE & SEQUESTRATION TECHNOLOGIES @ MIT, https://seques 
tration.mit.edu/tools/projects/kemper.html, archived at http://perma.cc/KX42-
GMVU (last updated Sept. 15, 2015). 
 155. Rebecca Smith, Southern Co. to Take $540 Million Charge For Kemper 
Plant, WALL ST. J., Apr. 24, 2013, at B4.  
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capture project in Illinois.156 While carbon capture technology may 
become cost effective, the industry literature does not indicate that 
this is expected any time soon. 
The EPA asserts the NSPS rule will have no net economic 
impact because the cost advantage of natural gas means that it is 
likely to replace coal even without the rule. Substituting natural 
gas for coal is environmentally beneficial157 because natural gas 
emits only a tiny fraction of the SO2 and NOX emitted by coal, and 
only about half the CO2 emitted by coal, to generate the same 
power.158 Hence, the major justification for the rule is reduction of 
greenhouse gas emissions. A variety of prices are attached to each 
ton of emissions, but the benefit of damage prevented by burning 
natural gas rather than coal is presumed to be about $50 per MW 
hour.159 However, in making this presumption the EPA failed to 
take the final step of estimating the value of the benefit of phasing 
out coal in favor of natural gas, which is the purpose of the NSPS 
rule. Assuming electricity use remains at about 3.75 billion MWs, 
and 40% of that number is generated from coal, then 1.5 billion 
MWs will be converted. Because the EPA calculation provides that 
the benefit of burning natural gas instead of coal is roughly $50 per 
MW, the total value of the 1.5 billion MWs converted from coal is 
$75 billion. This sum adds about a half percent to GDP and, best of 
all, allegedly costs nothing.  
V. WE ARE THE WORLD? 
Carbon cost is calculated in regulatory analysis not just for its 
assumed future impact on the United States, but also for its future 
impact on the world. Consider the DOE’s energy conservation 
                                                                                                             
 156. See Mark Drajem, Stalled Carbon-Capture Project Nears Construction 
with U.S. Aid, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www 
.businessweek.com/news/2014-01-16/stalled-carbon-capture-project-nears- 
construction-with-u-dot-s-dot-aid, archived at http://perma.cc/KV3R-UTTV.  
 157. AMANDA CURRY BROWN, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS FOR THE 
PROPOSED STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE FOR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 
FOR NEW STATIONARY SOURCES: ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS ES-3 
(Mar. 2012), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo23756/20120327 
proposalRIA.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JC32-T4EC. 
 158. Id. at 5-21, Table 5-5 Illustrative Emissions Profiles, New Coal and 
Natural Gas-Fired Generating Units. 
 159. Id. at 5-30, Table 5-7 Pollution Damages ($/MWh) from Illustrative 
New Coal Unit Relative to New Natural Gas Combined Cycle Unit. This is at a 
three percent discount rate and does not include possible benefits by reductions 
in pollutants such as mercury and arsenic, so it could be a conservative estimate. 
250 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
standards for residential furnace fans.160 The DOE estimates that 
the industry net present value (INPV) of the market for residential 
furnace fans is a quarter-billion dollars and “manufacturers may 
lose up to 21.6% of their INPV, which is approximately $54.4 
million.”161 In exchange, consumers will, assuming a similar 
discount rate, save $11.6 billion in exchange for $3.1 billion in 
higher costs at the time of installation.162 The rule meets a standard 
C-B test, however, the benefit is asserted to be even better. At a 
discount rate of seven percent, the economic value of the 
environmental benefit from reduced CO2 and NOX is asserted to be 
$20.1 billion.163 That number can be much smaller or larger 
depending on the discount rate chosen as well as the per-ton value 
placed on the emissions. 
The social cost of carbon (SCC) “is an estimate of the 
monetized damages associated with an incremental increase in 
carbon emissions in a given year. It is intended to include . . . 
changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property 
damages from increased flood risk, and the value of ecosystem 
services.”164 This measure includes both a domestic value and a 
global value. The global value is the one employed in C-B 
analyses. The residential heating fan rule discussion notes that the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) used a domestic SCC value 
of $2 per metric ton of CO2 and a global SCC value of $33 per ton 
in the 2011 Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) rule.165 
What value to use depends on many assumptions, including how 
far out in time and what discount rate.  
In its microwave oven rule, the DOE relied on an interagency 
agreement from 2010 in which the SCC was calculated. As the 
DOE notes, a ton of carbon is valued at $15.7 in 2050 if using a 
5% discount rate, at $65 if using a 2.5% discount rate, and at 
$136.2 if using a 3% discount rate, but this assumes the 95th 
percentile worst-case projection of climate change under assorted 
models from the IPCC.166 The vague authority to adopt such 
                                                                                                             
 160. Energy Conservation Program for Consumer Products: Standards for 
Residential Furnace Fans, 78 Fed. Reg. 64,068 (Oct. 25, 2013).  
 161. Id. at 64,070.  
 162. Id. at 64,071. That calculation assumes a seven percent discount rate. At 
a three percent discount rate the cost rises to $5.8 billion but the savings rise to 
$32 billion. See Table 1.3. 
 163. Id. At a discount rate of three percent the benefit would be $38 billion. 
 164. Id. at 64,106. 
 165. 78 Fed. Reg. at 64,107.  
 166. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOCIAL COST OF CARBON, 
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: SOCIAL COST OF CARBON FOR REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 1 (2010) [hereinafter, 
INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP.], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov 
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numbers is drawn from Executive Order 12866 of 1993, which 
uses the “best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, 
economic, and other information concerning the need for, and 
consequences of, the intended regulation.”167 Hence, the IPCC 
estimates are drawn upon for scientific expertise. Assertions of the 
IPCC are then used as the basis for a panel of experts to divine a 
price to be assigned today to carbon emissions that may have an 
impact decades in the future. Climate change is asserted to be a 
“global externality,”168 so the cost of emissions should be 
estimated globally.169 The United States contains only a tiny 
fraction of the world population, so the domestic value of reduced 
emissions is much smaller than the global value.170  
The SCC is the source of benefits from reduced CO2 emissions. 
According to the DOE’s calculations concerning microwave ovens, 
this is worth as much as $3.615 billion, and at a minimum it is 
worth $255 million, which is much higher than the regulation’s 
cost under the most conservative assumption. However, the large 
number attributed to the SCC almost entirely drives this result. The 
benefit of a ton of CO2 not emitted is predicted to be somewhere 
between $12.6 and $119.1 per ton, up substantially from the 2010 
SCC values of only $6.2 to $78.4 per ton. In particular, the DOE 
doubled the lower bound of the estimate, which placed more 
regulations in the black.  
The “value” of CO2 non-emissions is based on nothing other 
than the imagination of bureaucrats and advocates of carbon 
pricing. There is no real market for such emissions. The price, 
                                                                                                             
 
/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/for-agencies/Social-Cost-of-Carbon-for-RIA.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/9DG8-LJKW. In general, those who think climate 
change a serious threat wish to use low discount rates. The value in 100 years of 
$1,000 spent today assuming a 1% discount rate is $367; using a 7% discount 
rate yields less than $1 in benefits a century from now. See Maureen Cropper, 
How Should Benefits & Costs Be Discounted in an Intergenerational Context? 
183 RESOURCES 2013, http://www.rff.org/Publications/Resources/Pages/183-
Benefits-and-Costs-in-Intergenerational-Context.aspx, archived at http://perma 
.cc//T724-CGWX.  
 167. Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R 569 (1994). 
 168. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP., supra note 166, at 10. 
 169. Recall that, curiously, there was no consideration given to the increased 
carbon emission from increased cement production outside of the United States 
for cement likely to be sold to the United States after domestic production falls 
due to the rule. 
 170. The report notes that, rather than population, one could base the 
distribution of benefits as a share of world GDP, in which case the United States 
would capture about 23% of the benefit of reduced emissions rather than 7%-
10%. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP., supra note 166, at 11. 
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whether $12.6 or $119.1 per ton, exists only in the minds of those 
“interagency process” participants who speculate about the matter. 
The only place a so-called “market” for carbon exists is in the 
European Union, where carbon emissions are traded due to 
regulatory fiat. The carbon price has gyrated; it was $13 a ton in 
early 2013,171 but fell to less than half that by early 2014.172  
Asserting a definitive price for carbon as the basis for detailed 
federal policy-making that imposes hundred of billions in cost is 
akin to the Pentagon, the NSA, and Homeland Security 
announcing that the value to every American to be free of terrorists 
and foreign invasion is $2,000 to $20,000 per year per American, 
and then employing this value in determining military budget and 
planning. Pick your number. While Americans wish to be free of 
terrorist threats, it is traditionally not up to agency bureaucrats to 
determine the economic value of services, including national 
defense, which will be paid for by the private sector.  
A. Social Planning through Cost-Benefit 
In Executive Order 13563, Improving Regulation and 
Regulatory Review, President Obama instructed agencies to take 
into account nearly every imaginable value when doing C-B 
analysis. Agencies must include “values that are difficult or 
impossible to quantify, including equity, human dignity, fairness, 
and distributive impacts.”173 This has opened the barn door to 
throwing in any value, real or imagined, that may be asserted by 
any advocacy group in the calculation of benefits from regulations. 
                                                                                                             
 171. The price had been higher in Europe, but has been falling as the carbon-
trading program in the EU appears to be failing. See Mathew Carr, EU Carbon 
Price Expectations Plunge 47% in a Year, IETA Says, BLOOMBERG (May 28, 
2013, 6:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-28/eu-carbon-price-
expectations-plunge-47-in-a-year-ieta-says.html, archived at http://perma.cc 
/UZU7-NDFJ. The State of California has run some carbon auctions for limited 
purposes and the price is similar to that in Europe. See Additional Auction 1 and 
2 Summary Statistics, CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.arb.ca.gov 
/cc/capandtrade/auction/additionalauction1and2summarystatistics.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/QHX9-4PXP (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).  
 172. The price was 3.71 Euros in late March 2014, which was about $5. See 
James Murray, EU Carbon Price Rides the “Rollercoaster” as Emissions Fall, 
BUSINESSGREEN (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/analysis 
/2337543/eu-carbon-price-rides-the-rollercoaster-as-emissions-fall, archived at 
http://perma.cc/P8JT-4JTZ.  
 173. Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, Exec. Order 13563, 76 
Fed. Reg. 3,821, 3,821 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
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Human dignity has real value but no price, and fairness and equity 
are elusive concepts subject to endless exploitation.174  
Despite the fact that these values allow for endless speculation 
and exploitation, Cass Sunstein celebrates their inclusion in C-B 
analysis.175 He gives examples such as a ban on discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation, and easier bathroom access for 
employees in wheelchairs.176 Logically, would such rules be based 
on fairness, human dignity, or equity? Sunstein says the former is 
an example of fairness and the latter is an example of dignity. For 
the same examples, call the former an example of dignity and the 
latter an example of fairness. Does it change the value of either? 
Philosophers may have thoughts about such matters, and such rules 
may strike us generally as the right thing to do, but that does not 
mean they have a logical part in a C-B analysis.  
Similarly, Sunstein asserts that a value can be calculated for a 
regulation that may help reduce the likelihood of rape, and the fact 
of human dignity should be put into the calculation.177 Do the 
mental exercise: what amount of money would you pay to prevent 
your daughter from being raped? Thugs in another room will rape 
her unless you pay. Most people would empty their bank accounts 
to prevent such a thing. These are not market transactions 
susceptible of being priced. Criminal laws, and to a lesser extent, 
tort laws, are how civilized societies deal with such matters; there 
are no relevant market prices. Thus, to assign prices makes all of 
policy a utilitarian exercise. 
The war in Iraq may have cost a trillion dollars. Was it worth 
it? Such things are public policy decisions largely based on non-
market values.178 Political struggles ensue; costs and benefits can 
be asserted but cannot be scientifically calculated for policy 
matters that evolve as events proceed. Suppose Hitler had offered 
to sign an enforceable non-aggression treaty with the United 
States, so long as the United States allowed the Third Reich to 
continue its domination of Europe. It would not be hard to 
construct a C-B analysis to justify such a peace, especially if only 
                                                                                                             
 174. A century ago, the Federal Trade Commission was ordered to attack 
“unfair” business practices. The agency generally ignored that part of the statute, 
preferring to focus on deceptive acts, as it is easier to agree on a legally 
operational meaning of that term compared to the vague “unfair.” 
 175. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT (2013). 
 176. See id. 
 177. Id. at 10.  
 178. Market considerations no doubt matter. Iraq may have been of special 
concern due to its oil, as was the case with Kuwait previously. Government 
instability and slaughters in Rwanda, the Congo, and other places result in little 
more than head shaking. 
254 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 3 
 
 
 
the values of residents of the United States mattered. Adding 
Holocaust victim values into the mix changes the calculus. 
Unlike war and rape, there are other serious matters, such as 
starvation, that are well addressed by markets. How much would 
you pay not to starve or, less selfishly, not let your child starve? 
We address that problem through the market. Refusal to buy any 
food may result in voluntarily starvation, but food markets 
ordinarily work quite well, so the prices are relied on to help sort 
out the issue with little thought. Unfortunate people in barbarous 
countries do face starvation at various times, but such events are 
often caused by disastrous government policies that spur food 
shortages. Even if it is understood that bad government policies 
caused the food shortage, the “solution” of the moment is often to 
hand over food to thugs who control a country and hope for a 
better government.179 
Even if they can be recognized as noble goals, adding values 
such as dignity and equity into C-B analysis cannot be justified as 
good economics. Economists are not that smart. They cannot 
predict stock prices tomorrow, let alone values of fairness.180 
Taking C-B analysis to the level endorsed by Sunstein and 
increasingly employed by the Obama administration is central 
planning in new, more scientific-appearing clothes.181 Some 
prominent economists hail Sunstein’s declarations, which is not 
                                                                                                             
 179. There has been much debate about the wisdom of giving food to North 
Korea, which we know is a source of revenue for the dreadful regime there, but 
it still strikes many as the best alternative. Costs and benefits can be argued but 
not sensibly calculated. Even democratic regimes, such as India, can engage in 
food policies that provide more food for corrupt bureaucrats than for the poor 
who are supposed to be helped. See, e.g., Raymond Zhong & Vibhuti Agarwal, 
Modi’s U.S. Visit Fails to Resolve Food Subsidy Dispute, WALL ST. J. INDIA 
(Oct. 2, 2014, 10:26 AM) http://blogs.wsj.com/indiarealtime/2014/10/02/modis-
u-s-visit-fails-to-resolve-food-subsidy-dispute/, archived at http://perma.cc 
/A2UK-A2XQ . 
 180. Economists did not foresee the forthcoming financial collapse in 2008. 
Even those who gained fame from “predicting” the forthcoming problem may 
have simply been lucky. Ask enough experts about tomorrow and some will 
randomly be right. Similarly, efforts to predict inflation are similarly flawed 
despite the intellectual and computer firepower devoted to such efforts. See 
James H. Stock & Mark W. Watson, Inflation Forecasting, 12 NBER REPORTER 
13 (2012). 
 181. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were serious debates for 
decades about the wisdom on having central authorities control production, 
wages and prices. Even those who disdained the brutality of Stalinism argued 
that well-informed authorities, especially economists, could guide an economy 
to prosperity. Some argued for near-total controls, others advocated a more 
limited degree of central control. See, e.g., Stanislaw Wellisz & Ronald Findlay, 
Central Planning and the ‘Second Economy’ in Soviet-Type Systems, 96 ECON. 
J. 646, 646 (1986). 
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surprising.182 Personal, intellectual, and financial self-interest 
drives members of a profession to be more highly valued and is 
part of the process that guides society.183  
The rule of law has traditionally been sensible about such 
matters. Carelessly running a red light, plowing into another car, 
and killing a person results in a tort suit if solvent, possible 
criminal charges aside. Compensatory damages will equal the 
value of the life taken. The damages are largely based on the 
expected economic value of the life lost; a smart young doctor of 
30 is worth a lot more than a smart retired doctor of 85. Sums will 
be added in for other values, it is the best society can do. Such 
proceedings are rather cruelly technical as experts argue over the 
value of the life lost. The fact that the taking of the life was unfair 
does not change the matter. The family members who have 
suffered the loss would refuse to put a price tag on it, however, 
they will see a price tag assigned. Such matters can be addressed 
with rough justice through use of market values. 
To assert that regulators should assign values to fairness and 
dignity is fundamentally flawed if one believes that markets work 
under a rule of law. Thomas Sowell summarizes this in his book A 
Conflict of Visions.184 There are two fundamental tribes of 
thinkers.185 One tribe has what Sowell calls a constrained vision 
that relies on limited government and markets. The other tribe has 
an unconstrained vision of a world in which there can be rational 
planning to promote human perfectibility. No doubt Sunstein 
belongs to the latter tribe and is genuine in his pursuit of carefully 
crafted regulations that account for a multiplicity of values. James 
M. Buchanan, a Nobel laureate in economics, viewed the power of 
economics and the role of economists from the other side, as the 
title of his autobiography, Better than Plowing, attests.186 
Economists and other analysts are no smarter than farmers; they 
just do not work as hard. 
                                                                                                             
 182. According to the quotes that appear on the book jacket. 
 183. Difficult issues such as hedonic values continue to undergo refinement 
and, no doubt, improve, the problems are rife in in such generally accepted 
methodology. For mention of recent work, see V. Kerry Smith, Is 
Environmental Quality Worth the Cost?, 11 NBER REPORTER 14, 14 (2011). 
 184. See THOMAS SOWELL, A CONFLICT OF VISIONS: IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS 
OF POLITICAL STRUGGLES (2007). 
 185. In economics this is an ever-present issue that goes back many decades. 
Can economic planners do better than a market economy under a rule of law? 
See, e.g., Daniel Shapiro, Reviving the Socialist Calculation Debate: A Defense 
of Hayek Against Lange, 6 SOC. PHILOSOPHY & POLICY 139 (1989). 
 186. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, BETTER THAN PLOWING AND OTHER 
PERSONAL ESSAYS (1992). 
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CONCLUSION 
In Simpler: The Future of Government187 Professor Sunstein 
reflects on his years in the Obama Administration as Administrator 
of the OIRA. He explains how an application of behavioral 
economics to regulation allows the development of more 
sophisticated, effective regulation, which avoids the pitfalls of 
brute regulations that may have good intentions but are often 
poorly executed.188 The resulting rules can produce greater benefits 
at lower cost. 
 Some examples seem curious. He discusses the ban of 
Primatene Mist in 2011. It was “the only over-the-counter asthma 
medicine” available,189 but its propellant was a CFC banned under 
the Montreal Protocol.190 When the forthcoming ban was 
announced in 2008, it was presumed that a substitute propellant 
would be available by 2011, however, no new propellant came into 
existence. Thus, it had to be decided whether Primatine Mist would 
still be marketed despite the ban called for by the Protocol.  
Sunstein explains that Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
regulators had to wrestle with the tradeoff between environmental 
damage from the CFCs emitted by Primatene Mist and the health 
benefits to those who used the product.191 It was the only over-the-
counter product and was much cheaper than alternatives requiring 
prescriptions.192 As some asthma sufferers did not have regular 
health care, access to alternatives was even more difficult and 
costly.193 The FDA wrestled with these costs and benefits, it knew 
that banning the product would result in more hospitalizations and 
could result in significant costs.194 Ultimately, the FDA decided 
not to extend the life of the product because “asthma sufferers 
would do better to find doctors and to use the prescription 
medicine that really was right for them.”195 How this differs from 
old-style brute regulation is unclear, but Sunstein asserts that being 
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more scientific about C-B analysis is “a little like a plea for sense 
rather than nonsense.”196  
The key point is that by adding a fictional “market” value for 
CO2 non-emissions to the benefits of assorted environmental 
regulations, the total alleged benefits of the regulations are pushed 
to astronomical levels. As discussed previously, in 2011, the EPA 
published a summary of the benefits of the Clean Air Act of 
1990.197 By 2010, the Act was asserted to impose annual costs of 
about $50 billion, but yield benefits of about $1.3 trillion per 
year—a wonderful 26-1 benefit to cost ratio.198 Hence, about nine 
percent of the GDP is attributed to one statute and its attendant 
regulations. Those alleged benefits do not include CO2 reductions, 
which, as just discussed, drive benefits to even higher levels. If 
regulatory control by agencies continues to march forward using 
the advanced cost-benefit process that Sunstein helped enshrine at 
the OIRA, many claim that GDP will rise significantly. This 
remains to be seen, and there will be a market test of the 
beneficence of the latest variation of scientific central planning. 
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